Following her inauguration in May 2022, less than two years had passed with Katalin Novák as Hungary’s president until the parliament accepted her resignation last week. Despite her downfall, Novák’s career, particularly her presidential role, was a notable episode in the history of Orbán’s system, and not only because – as Péter Tölgyessy had recently put it in Partizán’s podcast – the Prime Minister might have seen her as his successor.
Novák, entering Fidesz’s frontline in the second half of the 2010s, may have represented something of a new beginning in the party’s personnel policy in many respects. She was the first female politician to receive significant responsibilities from Viktor Orbán, not only domestically, but also internationally. Novák is younger than the middle-aged men representing the party’s forefront (she is still only 46), is multilingual, and her political character was defined not by the confrontational style typical of Fidesz – but rather, by her smile. A competent woman who is also a mother of three: that’s how the career leading to the presidential seat started, coming to an unexpected end with the clemency scandal.
Viktor Orbán’s personal project
Novák’s ambition and vision regarding her own role differed radically from her two immediate predecessors, Pál Schmitt and János Áder. This difference was not only marked by establishing a formerly unseen degree of presidential social media presence, and her frequent trips abroad – from Oceania through Africa to South and North America: indeed, she might as well have been mistaken for a shadow foreign minister.
Although the presidential position’s political significance is rather slight in Hungary, one could still measure what kind of president Novák was by looking at the tools available to the president.
- As far as publicity is concerned, her positive image – kindness, openness and an ever-present smile she toured the country with – was an essential part of the Novák-project.
- Looking at the vetoes, Novák used this tool less frequently, and never when it would have been really uncomfortable for the government (for example the abolition of the KATA small business tax regime, the adoption of the status law in education, or the diminishing of the medical chamber’s powers). Nonetheless, her occasional vetoes still got her into conflicts at times.
- She also used the presidential spotlight not only for protocol events but also for political statements: these were primarily signals in foreign policy – like her calls urging Sweden’s NATO accession or her sympathetic stance towards Ukraine regarding the war.
- And last but not least: the right of pardon, which ultimately caused her downfall with the release of ‘paedophile-enabler’ Endre K., although the president had also received criticism back in 2023 for granting clemency to György Budaházy and his associates, convicted of terrorism – she tried explaining the affair to 24.hu, as far as circumstances would allow.
Considering all these, how did Novák perform as president, what should we remember from her term, what were the most crucial elements of her term? Seeking answers to these questions, we consulted Botond Felendy – mainly regarding Novák’s international activity – and online newspaper Jelen’s editor-in-chief Zoltán Lakner, with whom we discussed Novák’s future prospects and her embeddedness within NER (Fidesz’s informal political-economic network, often used as a synonym for government-affiliated corruption).
Katalin Novák, however, did not take her seat in the Sándor Palace out of nowhere: here’s a quick recap of her career so far.
A fast-track party career and divisive gestures
The multilingual (fluent in English, German, and French, intermediate in Spanish) Katalin Novák, also having studied in France and holding degrees in both economics and law, started her career in the framework of Fidesz-governments almost straight out of university. From 2001 to 2003, she worked as a desk officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and later, already as a mother of three, she became an advisor to Minister of Foreign Affairs János Martonyi in 2010. Two years later, she was appointed Minister of Human Resources Zoltán Balog’s chief of staff. Another two years had passed before she would move on to serve as State Secretary for Family and Youth Affairs at the same ministry. She continued in this position until 2020, when she was appointed Minister without Portfolio for Family Affairs.
She had managed to avoid any serious scandals prior to her election as president, although she did have several controversial statements and appearances:
- Her most infamous statement was made in 2010 on her blog, stating that she was grateful that “we do not live off a ridiculous income as hospital nurses or teachers.” She faced criticism for this statement several times; and she would once again strongly divide public opinion when she confronted protesters of the status law in front of the Sándor Palace.
- She was already serving as minister without portfolio in 2020 when she made her video about what it takes to be a successful woman. Her first sentence was: “I enjoy baking.” She also stated that women should not believe that they have to measure themselves against men, “and we should have at least the same position, the same salary as our partner.” The video also earned her a fair amount of criticism.
- During her presidential term, we also asked her about the Viktor Orbán and Fidesz-themed earrings, which inevitably branded her as a ‘party soldier’. She replied that, although her duty at the time was to represent the unity of the nation, she saw no problem in that she had earlier worn party symbols at a party event. (As a matter of fact, her predecessors Pál Schmitt and János Áder both belonged to Fidesz’s frontlines at one point.)
Presidential precedents: the face of a right-drifting Fidesz
Novák had received significant responsibilities years before her election as president, not only in the field of family and population policy, but also regarding foreign affairs.
While she had already been elected as Fidesz’s deputy president responsible for foreign affairs in 2017, her political presence rose to real prominence in 2019, when the relationship between Fidesz and the European People’s Party deteriorated. From this point on, Novák would increasingly criticise Brussels and sought to explain the situation to supporters of the ruling party – for example when she stated in 2019 that “We are living apart, but are not yet divorced.” Her critiques targeted not only Brussels but also the European People’s Party, accusing them of “migrant-friendly” (leftist) policies, excessive globalisation, liberal influence, anti-family stances and distancing from their Christian roots.
Novák on the other hand presented a vision of Europe where Christian and national values are dominant, and traditional families receive significant financial support from the state. These ideas echoed Prime Minister Orbán’s new conservative political agenda, which Novák also advocated for as Minister for Family Affairs. Notably, this was the point where “anti-gender” and “anti-LGBTQ” issues would become more prominent in Hungarian government policy.
There were multiple signs that Orbán himself had started “building” Novák’s potential as presidential candidate earlier. For example, when Fidesz’s still on-going search for allies started after having quit the EPP in the Spring of 2021, it was Novák herself who announced the party’s departure, stating:
The past few years have revealed that on most issues the European People’s Party stands for leftist values, with which we can no longer identify.
Fidesz, however, was pulling towards a nationalist, more radical direction, and amidst the building of networks on the very highest levels, Orbán would negotiate with Novák by his side on multiple occasions. They received Marine Le Pen together, and it was also the two of them who held discussions with Giorgia Meloni. Even as president, Novák maintained a close relationship with the Italian prime minister.
Before her election as head of state, Novák’s political identity focused on family-friendly policies, demographic revival, anti-refugee sentiments, religion, and conservative values. Novák had built her network not only within the framework of European politics. She was a regular speaker at various family-friendly forums and conferences, and would routinely appear alongside right-wing fundamentalist and anti-abortion figures.
But now, let’s fast forward to the recent past and examine Novák Katalin’s tenure as president.
Foreign policymaking bound to fail
Did Novák truly become a shadow-foreign minister during her barely two years-long presidential term? And how should we asses her activity in the field of foreign policy? Regarding these questions, we asked Botond Feledy, a foreign policy analyst.
Because Novák was much more in Orbán’s system than a mere formal representative of the state. She had access to places where even Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó, rightfully considered pro-Russian, did not. As her first presidential visit, she travelled to Warsaw to mend Hungarian-Polish relations deteriorated due to the war, but, according to Direkt36’s investigation, the mission did not see much success. Nevertheless, the Warsaw trip suggested that Novák might be able to open doors that had closed before official Hungarian foreign policy.
She travelled extensively, far surpassing her predecessors in this regard, and, according to a comparison from last year, her activity abroad even rivalled that of Péter Szijjártó. All while she was taking a significantly different stance on the Russian-Ukrainian war, stating “we cannot allow Russia to reach its military goals”; and later speaking of the need for “a peace plan that does not entail a Russian victory”. She even stated that Russia must withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory. During Pope Francis’ visit to Budapest, she also asked the head of the Catholic Church to intervene for a just peace.
On the other hand, according to Feledy, it is difficult to discern when Novák, as part of the Orbán-system known for moving several players simultaneously in each field including foreign policy, acted on her own, and when she would move along Fidesz party directives. It is a matter of fact that she would regularly consult with the Prime Minister, as it is customary in democracies. She probably also assumed the role of a mediator of sorts, which is also part of a conventional diplomatic division of labour. “What is certain, though, is that in some of Novák Katalin’s statements, she indeed struck a noticeably different tone than either the Foreign Minister or Viktor Orbán. It’s another question whether this pro-Western attitude could be outwardly convincing. Even more important is whether Novák Katalin’s stance had any impact on domestic decisions, and whether there was a reflection of this in, say, Hungary’s policies regarding Ukraine. Novák’s first trip to Kiev, for example, went against the government’s choices at the time, yet the Sándor Palace still elected to undertake the mission.
However, observing the system from the outside, I must say that the former president’s pro-Western attitude had no chance to bear real consequences. Only Viktor Orbán has the power to overwrite the Hungarian government’s policy towards Russia; so, as empathetic as Katalin Novák’s remarks regarding the war were towards the Ukrainians under attack, there was no real chance for a turnaround in Hungary’s actual stance.
Novák’s foreign policy was one of the last Western-aligned voices alongside the statements of Tibor Navracsics and Gergely Prőhle.”
In Feledy’s view, all this suggests that deviations from the mainstream of Hungarian foreign policy could indicate ambition on part of the Sándor Palace, but the President and her team did not always enjoy the support of the Prime Minister. Political analyst Gábor Török also hinted at this notion when he, in the wake of Novák’s downfall, told our paper that the president had expressed opinions even on matters where she had been given no authority at all.
It should be also noted that the President can in no way effectively shape foreign policy due to the constitutional setup of the Hungarian state. “The President lacks both political background and executive institutions to do so, as well as the necessary power – meaning that the president actually has minimal amount of leeway in shaping foreign policy.” This is especially true for the period after 2010.
The centralisation that would also characterise foreign policy after 2010 resulted in the situation that serious partners can now consider it a waste of time to meet and negotiate with anyone but Viktor Orbán. Since he is Hungary’s only autonomous decision-maker, and this is known in every capital.
According to Feledy, “Novák could, therefore, rather go on preparatory, mediatory, or even conciliatory missions. This raised the challenge that many governments found it difficult to deal with the case of an active, but not directly elected head of state: she has no great authority, yet she is an active player, so she would be received anyway in the end. She did indeed travel to a lot of places; her activity abroad was significant probably not only in domestic terms but also on an international level. Particularly when compared to the previous – and presumably the next – presidents with a background in law.”
Another indicator of governmental support is to assess how many times she had been accompanied by business delegations on these trips: this was a rare occasion, but it did happen, for example in Bahrain. Her stance differed from that of Szijjártó also regarding the Ukrainian war, and therefore regarding the relationship with Poland and Russia. She also stood up for Sweden’s NATO accession. “The place where she followed the mainstream of Hungarian foreign policy was primarily the Balkans. She also toured the region to visit various presidents and Hungarian communities beyond the borders in the Carpathian Basin. Once again, her two visits to the Transcarpathian region stand out, as two years had passed since the outbreak of the war before Szijjártó would set foot for the first time in Ukraine. An important difference, however, is that
Novák never visited China, as it is Prime Minister Viktor Orbán who maintains an exclusive relationship with the Chinese president and party leader.
According to Feledy, Novák’s foreign policy ran largely on bilateral grounds, yet she did not establish her own circle with other heads of state, like László Sólyom had endeavoured to.
The expert recalled that Novák’s career started in János Martonyi’s cabinet, and her high-level proficiency in multiple languages and her openness to the world served as the basis and internal motivation from which a significant foreign policy career, even in the position of foreign minister, could have followed. “During her presidential tenure, she could live out a lot of these impulses; it was evident that she enjoyed the frequent trips and foreign appearances.” However, she had no chance to deliver real foreign policy achievements due to a lack of tools to do so – this is why presidential foreign policymaking is inherently doomed to failure within Hungary’s constitutional environment.
Although the size of the presidential staff almost doubled during Novák’s term, it still cannot compete with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And when Péter Szijjártó meets Sergey Lavrov at the New York UN General Assembly, it becomes crystal clear that the pro-Western voices of Hungarian politics are not strong enough, no matter the urgent need for them, as we are still part of a Western alliance system.
Regarding Novák Katalin’s foreign policy achievements, Feledy still highlights one: the re-establishment of relations with Ukraine. In the expert’s view, Novák’s meeting with Volodimir Zelenskyy remains an important milestone.
No real boundaries crossed
Political scientist Zoltán Lakner also mentions Novák’s Kiev trip as one of her enduring presidential achievements. “Obviously the trip could not have taken place without governmental coordination, but it’s definitely to Novák’s credit that she did board the train to Kiev in November 2022. This required personal courage on her part; it was by no means self-evident for a politician to undertake such a journey to a war-torn country, given the risks involved. However, the Novák project was still part of Orbán’s political plans: the bare minimum of Western foreign policy expectations had to be met even after the outbreak of the war; the head of state sought to prevent the country’s isolation. Both in Hungary and abroad, Novák represented the nicer and softer side of Orbán’s regime, an endeavour not without success prior to the pardon scandal. Even despite the fact that Novák’s foreign policy activities also included the establishment of far-right networks, alongside her Western-oriented statements.”
This gives rise to another question: how autonomous of a player could Novák be? How much of an oversimplification is it to consider her a mere puppet to Orbán? And, on the other hand, how naive would it be to regard her as an independent, self-driven actor?
It’s no question that we’re talking about one of Orbán’s cadres. But in my view, this doesn’t necessarily mean someone under constant remote control, so to say; the more typical situation is that the given actor bears responsibility for their assigned tasks, for which they can be held accountable at any time, but their primary job is to handle the entrusted matters independently. And certainly, she wanted to prove both to herself and to others that she had her own authority, own will and ambitions: after all, we are discussing a politician here. She certainly did have some amount of authority and leeway, but this leeway applied only within the framework of Orbán’s NER. Which means that there was no possibility for openly criticising the system – but I don’t think she had any such ambitions, either. On the other hand, it was within the realm of possibilities to make decisions and statements that were not previously agreed upon, or ones that in a certain sense would represent a subtle crossing of boundaries. In any case, Novák at no point crossed the line demarking members of the system from the rest. Although in the case of Swedish NATO accession she quickly indicated her support, and that she would prefer a quick decision, it needs to be remembered that the government’s initial stance was also supportive – keeping both support and doubt on the table was part of the government’s later games. And Novák did nothing to quicken the ratification process – this would have meant crossing a boundary, something that was not possible in her case.
Kind smiles or not, she was part of the system
Lakner mentions another example where, in his view, Novák reached a boundary that she could not – and probably would not – cross.
“Last May, a group of teachers and students protested in front of the Sándor Palace, demanding the President not to sign the status law. Katalin Novák responded by meeting them in person, and it seemed that her smiles last only until the first sign of confrontation. I’m not sure if she thought of inviting the protesters inside for a coffee. Perhaps such a move – lifting the protesters up – was a boundary that was off limits to her according to the system’s logic? Anyway, this scene also demonstrated that kind smiles or not, she was part of the system.”
This is why the political scientist considers any parallel between Novák Katalin and former President Árpád Göncz to be baseless.
Göncz was a historical hero with a life of struggle, ending his presidency with an 80 per cent approval rating; while Novák, despite all her actual qualities and qualifications, is still a mere party functionary.
We also asked Lakner regarding Novák’s use of the veto option. According to the analyst, Novák refrained from using it on any important matters, but for example she did use the veto on the issue of privatising Hungary’s castle heritage, stepping on the toes of Minister of Construction and Transport János Lázár. “The toolbox of NER-presidents – with the exception of Pál Schmitt – still includes the veto; János Áder would also use it occasionally. It’s a more difficult question whether it represented the pinnacle of achievable political autonomy within the given field, or if one should interpret the occasional veto as a reflection of power struggles among the NER’s lobby groups.
Can Novák possibly return to public life?
After the clemency scandal, it is questionable if Novák could ever return to public life. In Lakner’s opinion, the most likely outcome is that in time, she will receive some sort of international assignment. “But of course, this is merely speculation based on how much effort the system has invested in building her career, and how young she still is. Perhaps the least noticeable way to re-establish her in politics would be to deploy her abroad – years later. The pardon scandal itself will remain memorable, partly because people still feel that there’s something fishy about it, that there are details still left undisclosed. Therefore, if Novák is to ever clear her name, she would need to reveal who pressured her into the decision, or who provided her with false information on the case. However, there’s little chance of that happening, as that would touch upon the very nature of the system; such revelations are unheard of within the NER, even Lajos Simicska remained silent on matters he was involved in.”
According to Lakner, what the former president deserves additional criticism for is primarily the fact that Novák showed no empathy towards the victims of child abuse at the Bicske children’s home.
I believe that if she wants absolution in the eyes of the general public, she should meet with the victims. She could regain the sympathy of the public through this. However, repentance and public apology is prohibited within Orbán’s system – another reason why Novák’s situation is difficult. Nevertheless, the question remains: what has been preventing her from initiating a meeting with these people? As a former president, she is entitled to a monthly salary of five million forints, what on Earth could they do to her? She’s facing no existential threats. It’s only up to her to break out of this circle. What could she lose by doing it? Since not doing it really tells you something about her character.
